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GLEN D. WARDLE and THORA , 
WARDLE, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
LESTER ROMERO, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 970139-CA 
i Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated as amended section 78-2a-
3(2)j and section 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the defendant has marshalled all the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings, as he must, and then has 
demonstrated that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous on the 
issues that there was no tolling of the running of the statute of 
limitations by any payment after June 1965. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion of law 
that the defendant's counterclaim is barred by the statute of 
1 
limitations contained in Utah Code Annotated sections 78-12-1, 
78-12-23, 70A-3-118, and 70A-3-122. 
Appellees agree with the appellant's statement of the 
standard of review of conclusions of law for correctness, and add 
the case of Scharf v. BMC Corp., 100 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The appellant has listed most of the determinative statutes 
and rules, however, the cited Utah Code Annotated section 70A-3-
122 was repealed and the substance thereof is contained in the 
1993 amendment designated as section 70A-3-118, Statute of 
Limitations, which provides as follows: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection 
(5), an action to enforce the obligation of a 
party to pay a note payable at a definite 
time must be commenced within six years after 
the due date of dates stated in the note or, 
if a due date is accelerated, within six 
years after the accelerated due date. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection 
(4) or (5), if demand for payment is made to 
the maker of a note payable on demand, an 
action to enforce the obligation of a party 
to pay the note must be commenced within six 
years after the demand. If no demand for 
payment is made to the maker, an action to 
enforce the note is barred if neither 
principal nor interest on the note has been 
paid for a continuous period of 10 years. 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection 
(4), an action to enforce the obligation of a 
party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft 
must be commenced within three years after 
dishonor of the draft or 10 years after the 
date of the draft, whichever period expires 
first. 
(4) An action to enforce the obligation 
of the acceptor of a certified check or the 
issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, 
or traveler's check must be commenced within 
three years after demand for payment is made 
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to the acceptor or issuerf as the case may 
be. 
(5) An action to enforce the obligation 
of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay 
the instrument must be commenced within six 
years after demand for payment is made to the 
maker, but if the instrument states a due 
date and the maker is not required to pay 
before that date, the six-year period begins 
when the demand for the payment is in effect 
and the due date has passed. 
(6) An action to enforce the obligation 
of a party to pay an accepted draft, other 
than a certified check, must be commenced 
within six years after the due date or dates 
stated in the draft or acceptance if the 
obligation of the acceptor is payable at a 
definite time, or within six years after the 
date of the acceptance if the obligation of 
the acceptor is payable on demand. 
(7) Unless governed by other law 
regarding claims for indemnity or 
contribution, an action for conversion of an 
instrument, for money had and received, or 
like action based on conversion, for breach 
of warranty, or to enforce an obligation, 
duty, or right arising under this chapter and 
not governed by this section must be 
commenced within three years after the cause 
of action accrues. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees agree with the appellant's statement as to the 
nature of the case and course of proceedings. However, the trial 
court recited his findings of fact in great detail from the bench 
in support of his ruling and the formal Findings of Fact 
substantially incorporate the oral findings of fact. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Findings of Fact attached to Appellant's brief (5 pages) 
are the facts adopted by the Appellees as the appropriate 
statement of facts rather than the Appellant's capsule statements 
which include facts not found by the trial court. 
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We reference the record (R) and transcript (TR) for evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings as a supplemental statement 
of facts. 
There were three witnesses called to testify: Thora Wardle 
and Maxine Romero for the plaintiff and Lester Romero for the 
defendant. Counsel for Lester Romero in opening statement told 
the court that "The statute of limitations is the primary issue 
in this case." (TR 8). 
Thora Wardle testified that she and her husband received a 
warranty deed to the house on the lot described in Exhibit 1, 
dated March 15, 1960, and that she has resided in that house 
since that time. (TR 11). She identified a conformed copy of a 
mortgage plaintiffs signed to Lester and Maxine Romero for $5,400 
(TR 14) which is dated March 14, 1960 (Exhibit 3). She was shown 
Exhibit 14, a promissory note dated March 1, 1960, in the sum of 
$6,000, which she said she never signed and she said the 
obligation to Romeros was $5,400 not $6,000. (TR 23-24) She also 
denied signing a Trust Deed, Exhibit 16, for $6,000. (TR 24). 
Appellees had supplied statutory references which indicated that 
the statute from which the Trust Deed form was taken had not been 
passed in 1960. (See plaintiff's memorandum in support of motion 
for partial summary judgment). (R 147-157). She also denied 
signing the quitclaim deed, Exhibit 16, which Romero claimed he 
was given as security. 
Mrs. Wardle was shown Exhibit 19, consisting of copies of 
three pages on account-lined paper captioned in handwriting 
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"Wardle Payments," which she had not seen before the pending 
litigations. Romero testified that Exhibit 19 is a copy taken 
from his columnar pad which was marked as Defendant's Exhibit 4. 
A copy of Exhibit 19 is attached in the addendum to this brief 
and is the same as Exhibit 4 except for the headings on the first 
page. A copy of the first page of Exhibit 4 is included in the 
addendum for a comparison which shows that the Exhibit 19 
supplied to plaintiffs1 counsel included headings not appearing 
on the original Exhibit 4. Romero testified that Exhibit 19 is a 
photo copy of Exhibit 4. (TR 82). The entries on Exhibit 4 begin 
in 1960 and the last entry is 1992. Although Romero testified 
that he made the entries of payments in the months in which 
payments were made, he only noted the month, not the day of 
payment. The payment in 1985 does not even show a month. It 
only shows: "1985 Horsey Knowlton sent me 100." Romero 
explained that Knowlton retained the $100 for a fee. (TR 87). 
Although Exhibit 19 and Exhibit 4 both show the last payment 
as being made in 1992, Romero said he found out he was probably a 
year off when his attorney told him to check the records, but in 
absence of records, Romero said his memory was that the payment 
was in 1991 not 1992. (TR 90-91). Assuming a payment in 1985f 
if no other payment were made until 1992, the six-year statute of 
limitations would have run, which is likely the reason he 
abandoned the 1992 entry in favor of his memory. 
Mrs. Wardle testified that the last payment made by her or 
her husband was in 1965. (TR 29 and 122) She testified on cross 
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examination that neither she nor her husband knew Horace Knowlton 
and never made any payment to him. (TR 117-118). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The appellant's sole argument on appeal is a challenge to 
the trial court's finding no payments after 1965 tolling the 
statute of limitations. The courtf on appeal, does not weigh the 
evidencef de novo, and great deference is given to the trial 
court's findings, especially when they are based upon an 
evaluation of conflicting live testimony. Appellant has not 
marshalled the evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
and has essentially reargued the factual case in a light most 
favorable to appellant's case, ignoring the evidence supportive 
of the trial court's findings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RULE 52(a) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROVIDES 
THAT FINDINGS OF FACT, WHETHER BASED ON ORAL OR 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, SHALL NOT BE SET ASIDE 
UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the cases 
construing the "clearly erroneous" rule, place a great burden 
upon the party who challenges the trial court's findings to 
marshal all the evidence in support of those findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); 
Butler Crockett v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah 
6 
1985) . 
Appellant acknowledges the clearly erroneous rule and 
instead of marshalling the evidence supportive of the findings, 
substitutes his opinion of the weight of the evidence and 
credibility of witnesses. Application of the clearly erroneous 
rule does not eliminate the traditional deference afforded a 
fact-finder to determine the credibility of witnesses. See State 
v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah App. 1987). The supreme court 
has stated: "It is not our function to determine the credibility 
of conflicting evidence or the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom." State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984). 
Rule 52 (a) also provides that "due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
witnesses." The clearly erroneous standard is applicable in 
equity cases. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991). 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS NOT ARGUED THAT THERE IS AN ABSENCE OF 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND THERE IS 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS 
Appellant concedes that there was evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings that no payments were made after 1965, but 
argues that the finding is against the "great weight of the 
evidence." In Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 
900 (Utah 1989), the court held that: 
Here, the evidence provides adequate support 
for the findings. We certainly cannot say 
that they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, especially when we give "due 
regard" to the trial court's opportunity to 
assess the credibility of the numerous 
7 
witnesses called by each party. 
The "documentary evidence/1 plaintiff's Exhibit 19 and 
defendant's Exhibit 4, are the record which Romero testified he 
kept of payments made by Wardles. (See appendix for Exhibits). 
The trial court analyzed this record, cited discrepancies and 
found "that this payment record is not worthy of any credibility 
. . . . " (See Findings of Fact, pp 3-4). 
A major discrepancy in Exhibits 4 and 19, affecting 
credibility was in the payment shown as "1992 Glen Wardle payed 
me 100" on Exhibit 4 and the addition of the word "cash" after 
100 on Exhibit 19. Exhibit 19 was the copy provided to 
plaintiffs' counsel whereas Exhibit 4 is the original. At trial, 
Romero testified that the "1992" notation should have been "1991" 
which he determined by recollection after his attorney asked for 
verification of this 1992 year. The strong inference to be drawn 
is that he changed to the year "1991" because the record of the 
previous payment was "1985" and if the next payment were "1992," 
it would be a seven-year lapse creating another legal basis for 
ruling that the statute of limitations of six years barred the 
claim. 
The trial court properly relied upon the testimony of Mrs. 
Wardle and her daughter, Maxine Romero, that no payments were 
made after 1965. Once the statute bars the claim, the Statute of 
Limitations cannot be revived or extended by partial payment. 
See State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, 894 P.2d 
1270, 1276 (Utah App. 1995). 
8 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Dated this H day of flyCut^^. , 1997. 
^ ^ T Z ^ g ^ f 
Jeorge K. Fadel 
Attorney for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed two copies of the Appellees' brief to Mr. 
James R. Wilson, Attorney for the Appellant, 9 Exchange Place, 
1100 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this V ^ day 
of U^/^W7 , 1997. 
Gebrge K; Fadel 
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